Fix .gitignore: stop tracking ignored files

This commit is contained in:
5t4l1n
2025-07-27 10:39:02 +05:30
parent b42747e9a3
commit 3a87ef0576
625 changed files with 88566 additions and 63 deletions
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (proxy/utils/Initializable.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.2;
import "../../utils/Address.sol";
/**
* @dev This is a base contract to aid in writing upgradeable contracts, or any kind of contract that will be deployed
* behind a proxy. Since proxied contracts do not make use of a constructor, it's common to move constructor logic to an
* external initializer function, usually called `initialize`. It then becomes necessary to protect this initializer
* function so it can only be called once. The {initializer} modifier provided by this contract will have this effect.
*
* The initialization functions use a version number. Once a version number is used, it is consumed and cannot be
* reused. This mechanism prevents re-execution of each "step" but allows the creation of new initialization steps in
* case an upgrade adds a module that needs to be initialized.
*
* For example:
*
* [.hljs-theme-light.nopadding]
* ```solidity
* contract MyToken is ERC20Upgradeable {
* function initialize() initializer public {
* __ERC20_init("MyToken", "MTK");
* }
* }
*
* contract MyTokenV2 is MyToken, ERC20PermitUpgradeable {
* function initializeV2() reinitializer(2) public {
* __ERC20Permit_init("MyToken");
* }
* }
* ```
*
* TIP: To avoid leaving the proxy in an uninitialized state, the initializer function should be called as early as
* possible by providing the encoded function call as the `_data` argument to {ERC1967Proxy-constructor}.
*
* CAUTION: When used with inheritance, manual care must be taken to not invoke a parent initializer twice, or to ensure
* that all initializers are idempotent. This is not verified automatically as constructors are by Solidity.
*
* [CAUTION]
* ====
* Avoid leaving a contract uninitialized.
*
* An uninitialized contract can be taken over by an attacker. This applies to both a proxy and its implementation
* contract, which may impact the proxy. To prevent the implementation contract from being used, you should invoke
* the {_disableInitializers} function in the constructor to automatically lock it when it is deployed:
*
* [.hljs-theme-light.nopadding]
* ```
* /// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor
* constructor() {
* _disableInitializers();
* }
* ```
* ====
*/
abstract contract Initializable {
/**
* @dev Indicates that the contract has been initialized.
* @custom:oz-retyped-from bool
*/
uint8 private _initialized;
/**
* @dev Indicates that the contract is in the process of being initialized.
*/
bool private _initializing;
/**
* @dev Triggered when the contract has been initialized or reinitialized.
*/
event Initialized(uint8 version);
/**
* @dev A modifier that defines a protected initializer function that can be invoked at most once. In its scope,
* `onlyInitializing` functions can be used to initialize parent contracts.
*
* Similar to `reinitializer(1)`, except that functions marked with `initializer` can be nested in the context of a
* constructor.
*
* Emits an {Initialized} event.
*/
modifier initializer() {
bool isTopLevelCall = !_initializing;
require(
(isTopLevelCall && _initialized < 1) || (!Address.isContract(address(this)) && _initialized == 1),
"Initializable: contract is already initialized"
);
_initialized = 1;
if (isTopLevelCall) {
_initializing = true;
}
_;
if (isTopLevelCall) {
_initializing = false;
emit Initialized(1);
}
}
/**
* @dev A modifier that defines a protected reinitializer function that can be invoked at most once, and only if the
* contract hasn't been initialized to a greater version before. In its scope, `onlyInitializing` functions can be
* used to initialize parent contracts.
*
* A reinitializer may be used after the original initialization step. This is essential to configure modules that
* are added through upgrades and that require initialization.
*
* When `version` is 1, this modifier is similar to `initializer`, except that functions marked with `reinitializer`
* cannot be nested. If one is invoked in the context of another, execution will revert.
*
* Note that versions can jump in increments greater than 1; this implies that if multiple reinitializers coexist in
* a contract, executing them in the right order is up to the developer or operator.
*
* WARNING: setting the version to 255 will prevent any future reinitialization.
*
* Emits an {Initialized} event.
*/
modifier reinitializer(uint8 version) {
require(!_initializing && _initialized < version, "Initializable: contract is already initialized");
_initialized = version;
_initializing = true;
_;
_initializing = false;
emit Initialized(version);
}
/**
* @dev Modifier to protect an initialization function so that it can only be invoked by functions with the
* {initializer} and {reinitializer} modifiers, directly or indirectly.
*/
modifier onlyInitializing() {
require(_initializing, "Initializable: contract is not initializing");
_;
}
/**
* @dev Locks the contract, preventing any future reinitialization. This cannot be part of an initializer call.
* Calling this in the constructor of a contract will prevent that contract from being initialized or reinitialized
* to any version. It is recommended to use this to lock implementation contracts that are designed to be called
* through proxies.
*
* Emits an {Initialized} event the first time it is successfully executed.
*/
function _disableInitializers() internal virtual {
require(!_initializing, "Initializable: contract is initializing");
if (_initialized != type(uint8).max) {
_initialized = type(uint8).max;
emit Initialized(type(uint8).max);
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns the highest version that has been initialized. See {reinitializer}.
*/
function _getInitializedVersion() internal view returns (uint8) {
return _initialized;
}
/**
* @dev Returns `true` if the contract is currently initializing. See {onlyInitializing}.
*/
function _isInitializing() internal view returns (bool) {
return _initializing;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../../interfaces/draft-IERC1822.sol";
import "../ERC1967/ERC1967Upgrade.sol";
/**
* @dev An upgradeability mechanism designed for UUPS proxies. The functions included here can perform an upgrade of an
* {ERC1967Proxy}, when this contract is set as the implementation behind such a proxy.
*
* A security mechanism ensures that an upgrade does not turn off upgradeability accidentally, although this risk is
* reinstated if the upgrade retains upgradeability but removes the security mechanism, e.g. by replacing
* `UUPSUpgradeable` with a custom implementation of upgrades.
*
* The {_authorizeUpgrade} function must be overridden to include access restriction to the upgrade mechanism.
*
* _Available since v4.1._
*/
abstract contract UUPSUpgradeable is IERC1822Proxiable, ERC1967Upgrade {
/// @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow state-variable-immutable state-variable-assignment
address private immutable __self = address(this);
/**
* @dev Check that the execution is being performed through a delegatecall call and that the execution context is
* a proxy contract with an implementation (as defined in ERC1967) pointing to self. This should only be the case
* for UUPS and transparent proxies that are using the current contract as their implementation. Execution of a
* function through ERC1167 minimal proxies (clones) would not normally pass this test, but is not guaranteed to
* fail.
*/
modifier onlyProxy() {
require(address(this) != __self, "Function must be called through delegatecall");
require(_getImplementation() == __self, "Function must be called through active proxy");
_;
}
/**
* @dev Check that the execution is not being performed through a delegate call. This allows a function to be
* callable on the implementing contract but not through proxies.
*/
modifier notDelegated() {
require(address(this) == __self, "UUPSUpgradeable: must not be called through delegatecall");
_;
}
/**
* @dev Implementation of the ERC1822 {proxiableUUID} function. This returns the storage slot used by the
* implementation. It is used to validate the implementation's compatibility when performing an upgrade.
*
* IMPORTANT: A proxy pointing at a proxiable contract should not be considered proxiable itself, because this risks
* bricking a proxy that upgrades to it, by delegating to itself until out of gas. Thus it is critical that this
* function revert if invoked through a proxy. This is guaranteed by the `notDelegated` modifier.
*/
function proxiableUUID() external view virtual override notDelegated returns (bytes32) {
return _IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT;
}
/**
* @dev Upgrade the implementation of the proxy to `newImplementation`.
*
* Calls {_authorizeUpgrade}.
*
* Emits an {Upgraded} event.
*
* @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow-reachable delegatecall
*/
function upgradeTo(address newImplementation) public virtual onlyProxy {
_authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);
_upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, new bytes(0), false);
}
/**
* @dev Upgrade the implementation of the proxy to `newImplementation`, and subsequently execute the function call
* encoded in `data`.
*
* Calls {_authorizeUpgrade}.
*
* Emits an {Upgraded} event.
*
* @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow-reachable delegatecall
*/
function upgradeToAndCall(address newImplementation, bytes memory data) public payable virtual onlyProxy {
_authorizeUpgrade(newImplementation);
_upgradeToAndCallUUPS(newImplementation, data, true);
}
/**
* @dev Function that should revert when `msg.sender` is not authorized to upgrade the contract. Called by
* {upgradeTo} and {upgradeToAndCall}.
*
* Normally, this function will use an xref:access.adoc[access control] modifier such as {Ownable-onlyOwner}.
*
* ```solidity
* function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyOwner {}
* ```
*/
function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal virtual;
}