Fix .gitignore: stop tracking ignored files

This commit is contained in:
5t4l1n
2025-07-27 10:39:02 +05:30
parent b42747e9a3
commit 3a87ef0576
625 changed files with 88566 additions and 63 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "../Strings.sol";
/**
* @dev Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) operations.
*
* These functions can be used to verify that a message was signed by the holder
* of the private keys of a given address.
*/
library ECDSA {
enum RecoverError {
NoError,
InvalidSignature,
InvalidSignatureLength,
InvalidSignatureS,
InvalidSignatureV // Deprecated in v4.8
}
function _throwError(RecoverError error) private pure {
if (error == RecoverError.NoError) {
return; // no error: do nothing
} else if (error == RecoverError.InvalidSignature) {
revert("ECDSA: invalid signature");
} else if (error == RecoverError.InvalidSignatureLength) {
revert("ECDSA: invalid signature length");
} else if (error == RecoverError.InvalidSignatureS) {
revert("ECDSA: invalid signature 's' value");
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns the address that signed a hashed message (`hash`) with
* `signature` or error string. This address can then be used for verification purposes.
*
* The `ecrecover` EVM opcode allows for malleable (non-unique) signatures:
* this function rejects them by requiring the `s` value to be in the lower
* half order, and the `v` value to be either 27 or 28.
*
* IMPORTANT: `hash` _must_ be the result of a hash operation for the
* verification to be secure: it is possible to craft signatures that
* recover to arbitrary addresses for non-hashed data. A safe way to ensure
* this is by receiving a hash of the original message (which may otherwise
* be too long), and then calling {toEthSignedMessageHash} on it.
*
* Documentation for signature generation:
* - with https://web3js.readthedocs.io/en/v1.3.4/web3-eth-accounts.html#sign[Web3.js]
* - with https://docs.ethers.io/v5/api/signer/#Signer-signMessage[ethers]
*
* _Available since v4.3._
*/
function tryRecover(bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature) internal pure returns (address, RecoverError) {
if (signature.length == 65) {
bytes32 r;
bytes32 s;
uint8 v;
// ecrecover takes the signature parameters, and the only way to get them
// currently is to use assembly.
/// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
assembly {
r := mload(add(signature, 0x20))
s := mload(add(signature, 0x40))
v := byte(0, mload(add(signature, 0x60)))
}
return tryRecover(hash, v, r, s);
} else {
return (address(0), RecoverError.InvalidSignatureLength);
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns the address that signed a hashed message (`hash`) with
* `signature`. This address can then be used for verification purposes.
*
* The `ecrecover` EVM opcode allows for malleable (non-unique) signatures:
* this function rejects them by requiring the `s` value to be in the lower
* half order, and the `v` value to be either 27 or 28.
*
* IMPORTANT: `hash` _must_ be the result of a hash operation for the
* verification to be secure: it is possible to craft signatures that
* recover to arbitrary addresses for non-hashed data. A safe way to ensure
* this is by receiving a hash of the original message (which may otherwise
* be too long), and then calling {toEthSignedMessageHash} on it.
*/
function recover(bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature) internal pure returns (address) {
(address recovered, RecoverError error) = tryRecover(hash, signature);
_throwError(error);
return recovered;
}
/**
* @dev Overload of {ECDSA-tryRecover} that receives the `r` and `vs` short-signature fields separately.
*
* See https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2098[EIP-2098 short signatures]
*
* _Available since v4.3._
*/
function tryRecover(bytes32 hash, bytes32 r, bytes32 vs) internal pure returns (address, RecoverError) {
bytes32 s = vs & bytes32(0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff);
uint8 v = uint8((uint256(vs) >> 255) + 27);
return tryRecover(hash, v, r, s);
}
/**
* @dev Overload of {ECDSA-recover} that receives the `r and `vs` short-signature fields separately.
*
* _Available since v4.2._
*/
function recover(bytes32 hash, bytes32 r, bytes32 vs) internal pure returns (address) {
(address recovered, RecoverError error) = tryRecover(hash, r, vs);
_throwError(error);
return recovered;
}
/**
* @dev Overload of {ECDSA-tryRecover} that receives the `v`,
* `r` and `s` signature fields separately.
*
* _Available since v4.3._
*/
function tryRecover(bytes32 hash, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) internal pure returns (address, RecoverError) {
// EIP-2 still allows signature malleability for ecrecover(). Remove this possibility and make the signature
// unique. Appendix F in the Ethereum Yellow paper (https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf), defines
// the valid range for s in (301): 0 < s < secp256k1n ÷ 2 + 1, and for v in (302): v ∈ {27, 28}. Most
// signatures from current libraries generate a unique signature with an s-value in the lower half order.
//
// If your library generates malleable signatures, such as s-values in the upper range, calculate a new s-value
// with 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141 - s1 and flip v from 27 to 28 or
// vice versa. If your library also generates signatures with 0/1 for v instead 27/28, add 27 to v to accept
// these malleable signatures as well.
if (uint256(s) > 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0) {
return (address(0), RecoverError.InvalidSignatureS);
}
// If the signature is valid (and not malleable), return the signer address
address signer = ecrecover(hash, v, r, s);
if (signer == address(0)) {
return (address(0), RecoverError.InvalidSignature);
}
return (signer, RecoverError.NoError);
}
/**
* @dev Overload of {ECDSA-recover} that receives the `v`,
* `r` and `s` signature fields separately.
*/
function recover(bytes32 hash, uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) internal pure returns (address) {
(address recovered, RecoverError error) = tryRecover(hash, v, r, s);
_throwError(error);
return recovered;
}
/**
* @dev Returns an Ethereum Signed Message, created from a `hash`. This
* produces hash corresponding to the one signed with the
* https://eth.wiki/json-rpc/API#eth_sign[`eth_sign`]
* JSON-RPC method as part of EIP-191.
*
* See {recover}.
*/
function toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes32 hash) internal pure returns (bytes32 message) {
// 32 is the length in bytes of hash,
// enforced by the type signature above
/// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
assembly {
mstore(0x00, "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32")
mstore(0x1c, hash)
message := keccak256(0x00, 0x3c)
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns an Ethereum Signed Message, created from `s`. This
* produces hash corresponding to the one signed with the
* https://eth.wiki/json-rpc/API#eth_sign[`eth_sign`]
* JSON-RPC method as part of EIP-191.
*
* See {recover}.
*/
function toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes memory s) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n", Strings.toString(s.length), s));
}
/**
* @dev Returns an Ethereum Signed Typed Data, created from a
* `domainSeparator` and a `structHash`. This produces hash corresponding
* to the one signed with the
* https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712[`eth_signTypedData`]
* JSON-RPC method as part of EIP-712.
*
* See {recover}.
*/
function toTypedDataHash(bytes32 domainSeparator, bytes32 structHash) internal pure returns (bytes32 data) {
/// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
assembly {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore(ptr, "\x19\x01")
mstore(add(ptr, 0x02), domainSeparator)
mstore(add(ptr, 0x22), structHash)
data := keccak256(ptr, 0x42)
}
}
/**
* @dev Returns an Ethereum Signed Data with intended validator, created from a
* `validator` and `data` according to the version 0 of EIP-191.
*
* See {recover}.
*/
function toDataWithIntendedValidatorHash(address validator, bytes memory data) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked("\x19\x00", validator, data));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.8;
import "./ECDSA.sol";
import "../ShortStrings.sol";
import "../../interfaces/IERC5267.sol";
/**
* @dev https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712[EIP 712] is a standard for hashing and signing of typed structured data.
*
* The encoding specified in the EIP is very generic, and such a generic implementation in Solidity is not feasible,
* thus this contract does not implement the encoding itself. Protocols need to implement the type-specific encoding
* they need in their contracts using a combination of `abi.encode` and `keccak256`.
*
* This contract implements the EIP 712 domain separator ({_domainSeparatorV4}) that is used as part of the encoding
* scheme, and the final step of the encoding to obtain the message digest that is then signed via ECDSA
* ({_hashTypedDataV4}).
*
* The implementation of the domain separator was designed to be as efficient as possible while still properly updating
* the chain id to protect against replay attacks on an eventual fork of the chain.
*
* NOTE: This contract implements the version of the encoding known as "v4", as implemented by the JSON RPC method
* https://docs.metamask.io/guide/signing-data.html[`eth_signTypedDataV4` in MetaMask].
*
* NOTE: In the upgradeable version of this contract, the cached values will correspond to the address, and the domain
* separator of the implementation contract. This will cause the `_domainSeparatorV4` function to always rebuild the
* separator from the immutable values, which is cheaper than accessing a cached version in cold storage.
*
* _Available since v3.4._
*
* @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow state-variable-immutable state-variable-assignment
*/
abstract contract EIP712 is IERC5267 {
using ShortStrings for *;
bytes32 private constant _TYPE_HASH =
keccak256("EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)");
// Cache the domain separator as an immutable value, but also store the chain id that it corresponds to, in order to
// invalidate the cached domain separator if the chain id changes.
bytes32 private immutable _cachedDomainSeparator;
uint256 private immutable _cachedChainId;
address private immutable _cachedThis;
bytes32 private immutable _hashedName;
bytes32 private immutable _hashedVersion;
ShortString private immutable _name;
ShortString private immutable _version;
string private _nameFallback;
string private _versionFallback;
/**
* @dev Initializes the domain separator and parameter caches.
*
* The meaning of `name` and `version` is specified in
* https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712#definition-of-domainseparator[EIP 712]:
*
* - `name`: the user readable name of the signing domain, i.e. the name of the DApp or the protocol.
* - `version`: the current major version of the signing domain.
*
* NOTE: These parameters cannot be changed except through a xref:learn::upgrading-smart-contracts.adoc[smart
* contract upgrade].
*/
constructor(string memory name, string memory version) {
_name = name.toShortStringWithFallback(_nameFallback);
_version = version.toShortStringWithFallback(_versionFallback);
_hashedName = keccak256(bytes(name));
_hashedVersion = keccak256(bytes(version));
_cachedChainId = block.chainid;
_cachedDomainSeparator = _buildDomainSeparator();
_cachedThis = address(this);
}
/**
* @dev Returns the domain separator for the current chain.
*/
function _domainSeparatorV4() internal view returns (bytes32) {
if (address(this) == _cachedThis && block.chainid == _cachedChainId) {
return _cachedDomainSeparator;
} else {
return _buildDomainSeparator();
}
}
function _buildDomainSeparator() private view returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(_TYPE_HASH, _hashedName, _hashedVersion, block.chainid, address(this)));
}
/**
* @dev Given an already https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712#definition-of-hashstruct[hashed struct], this
* function returns the hash of the fully encoded EIP712 message for this domain.
*
* This hash can be used together with {ECDSA-recover} to obtain the signer of a message. For example:
*
* ```solidity
* bytes32 digest = _hashTypedDataV4(keccak256(abi.encode(
* keccak256("Mail(address to,string contents)"),
* mailTo,
* keccak256(bytes(mailContents))
* )));
* address signer = ECDSA.recover(digest, signature);
* ```
*/
function _hashTypedDataV4(bytes32 structHash) internal view virtual returns (bytes32) {
return ECDSA.toTypedDataHash(_domainSeparatorV4(), structHash);
}
/**
* @dev See {EIP-5267}.
*
* _Available since v4.9._
*/
function eip712Domain()
public
view
virtual
override
returns (
bytes1 fields,
string memory name,
string memory version,
uint256 chainId,
address verifyingContract,
bytes32 salt,
uint256[] memory extensions
)
{
return (
hex"0f", // 01111
_name.toStringWithFallback(_nameFallback),
_version.toStringWithFallback(_versionFallback),
block.chainid,
address(this),
bytes32(0),
new uint256[](0)
);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (utils/cryptography/MerkleProof.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
/**
* @dev These functions deal with verification of Merkle Tree proofs.
*
* The tree and the proofs can be generated using our
* https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/merkle-tree[JavaScript library].
* You will find a quickstart guide in the readme.
*
* WARNING: You should avoid using leaf values that are 64 bytes long prior to
* hashing, or use a hash function other than keccak256 for hashing leaves.
* This is because the concatenation of a sorted pair of internal nodes in
* the merkle tree could be reinterpreted as a leaf value.
* OpenZeppelin's JavaScript library generates merkle trees that are safe
* against this attack out of the box.
*/
library MerkleProof {
/**
* @dev Returns true if a `leaf` can be proved to be a part of a Merkle tree
* defined by `root`. For this, a `proof` must be provided, containing
* sibling hashes on the branch from the leaf to the root of the tree. Each
* pair of leaves and each pair of pre-images are assumed to be sorted.
*/
function verify(bytes32[] memory proof, bytes32 root, bytes32 leaf) internal pure returns (bool) {
return processProof(proof, leaf) == root;
}
/**
* @dev Calldata version of {verify}
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function verifyCalldata(bytes32[] calldata proof, bytes32 root, bytes32 leaf) internal pure returns (bool) {
return processProofCalldata(proof, leaf) == root;
}
/**
* @dev Returns the rebuilt hash obtained by traversing a Merkle tree up
* from `leaf` using `proof`. A `proof` is valid if and only if the rebuilt
* hash matches the root of the tree. When processing the proof, the pairs
* of leafs & pre-images are assumed to be sorted.
*
* _Available since v4.4._
*/
function processProof(bytes32[] memory proof, bytes32 leaf) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
bytes32 computedHash = leaf;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < proof.length; i++) {
computedHash = _hashPair(computedHash, proof[i]);
}
return computedHash;
}
/**
* @dev Calldata version of {processProof}
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function processProofCalldata(bytes32[] calldata proof, bytes32 leaf) internal pure returns (bytes32) {
bytes32 computedHash = leaf;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < proof.length; i++) {
computedHash = _hashPair(computedHash, proof[i]);
}
return computedHash;
}
/**
* @dev Returns true if the `leaves` can be simultaneously proven to be a part of a merkle tree defined by
* `root`, according to `proof` and `proofFlags` as described in {processMultiProof}.
*
* CAUTION: Not all merkle trees admit multiproofs. See {processMultiProof} for details.
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function multiProofVerify(
bytes32[] memory proof,
bool[] memory proofFlags,
bytes32 root,
bytes32[] memory leaves
) internal pure returns (bool) {
return processMultiProof(proof, proofFlags, leaves) == root;
}
/**
* @dev Calldata version of {multiProofVerify}
*
* CAUTION: Not all merkle trees admit multiproofs. See {processMultiProof} for details.
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function multiProofVerifyCalldata(
bytes32[] calldata proof,
bool[] calldata proofFlags,
bytes32 root,
bytes32[] memory leaves
) internal pure returns (bool) {
return processMultiProofCalldata(proof, proofFlags, leaves) == root;
}
/**
* @dev Returns the root of a tree reconstructed from `leaves` and sibling nodes in `proof`. The reconstruction
* proceeds by incrementally reconstructing all inner nodes by combining a leaf/inner node with either another
* leaf/inner node or a proof sibling node, depending on whether each `proofFlags` item is true or false
* respectively.
*
* CAUTION: Not all merkle trees admit multiproofs. To use multiproofs, it is sufficient to ensure that: 1) the tree
* is complete (but not necessarily perfect), 2) the leaves to be proven are in the opposite order they are in the
* tree (i.e., as seen from right to left starting at the deepest layer and continuing at the next layer).
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function processMultiProof(
bytes32[] memory proof,
bool[] memory proofFlags,
bytes32[] memory leaves
) internal pure returns (bytes32 merkleRoot) {
// This function rebuilds the root hash by traversing the tree up from the leaves. The root is rebuilt by
// consuming and producing values on a queue. The queue starts with the `leaves` array, then goes onto the
// `hashes` array. At the end of the process, the last hash in the `hashes` array should contain the root of
// the merkle tree.
uint256 leavesLen = leaves.length;
uint256 totalHashes = proofFlags.length;
// Check proof validity.
require(leavesLen + proof.length - 1 == totalHashes, "MerkleProof: invalid multiproof");
// The xxxPos values are "pointers" to the next value to consume in each array. All accesses are done using
// `xxx[xxxPos++]`, which return the current value and increment the pointer, thus mimicking a queue's "pop".
bytes32[] memory hashes = new bytes32[](totalHashes);
uint256 leafPos = 0;
uint256 hashPos = 0;
uint256 proofPos = 0;
// At each step, we compute the next hash using two values:
// - a value from the "main queue". If not all leaves have been consumed, we get the next leaf, otherwise we
// get the next hash.
// - depending on the flag, either another value from the "main queue" (merging branches) or an element from the
// `proof` array.
for (uint256 i = 0; i < totalHashes; i++) {
bytes32 a = leafPos < leavesLen ? leaves[leafPos++] : hashes[hashPos++];
bytes32 b = proofFlags[i]
? (leafPos < leavesLen ? leaves[leafPos++] : hashes[hashPos++])
: proof[proofPos++];
hashes[i] = _hashPair(a, b);
}
if (totalHashes > 0) {
unchecked {
return hashes[totalHashes - 1];
}
} else if (leavesLen > 0) {
return leaves[0];
} else {
return proof[0];
}
}
/**
* @dev Calldata version of {processMultiProof}.
*
* CAUTION: Not all merkle trees admit multiproofs. See {processMultiProof} for details.
*
* _Available since v4.7._
*/
function processMultiProofCalldata(
bytes32[] calldata proof,
bool[] calldata proofFlags,
bytes32[] memory leaves
) internal pure returns (bytes32 merkleRoot) {
// This function rebuilds the root hash by traversing the tree up from the leaves. The root is rebuilt by
// consuming and producing values on a queue. The queue starts with the `leaves` array, then goes onto the
// `hashes` array. At the end of the process, the last hash in the `hashes` array should contain the root of
// the merkle tree.
uint256 leavesLen = leaves.length;
uint256 totalHashes = proofFlags.length;
// Check proof validity.
require(leavesLen + proof.length - 1 == totalHashes, "MerkleProof: invalid multiproof");
// The xxxPos values are "pointers" to the next value to consume in each array. All accesses are done using
// `xxx[xxxPos++]`, which return the current value and increment the pointer, thus mimicking a queue's "pop".
bytes32[] memory hashes = new bytes32[](totalHashes);
uint256 leafPos = 0;
uint256 hashPos = 0;
uint256 proofPos = 0;
// At each step, we compute the next hash using two values:
// - a value from the "main queue". If not all leaves have been consumed, we get the next leaf, otherwise we
// get the next hash.
// - depending on the flag, either another value from the "main queue" (merging branches) or an element from the
// `proof` array.
for (uint256 i = 0; i < totalHashes; i++) {
bytes32 a = leafPos < leavesLen ? leaves[leafPos++] : hashes[hashPos++];
bytes32 b = proofFlags[i]
? (leafPos < leavesLen ? leaves[leafPos++] : hashes[hashPos++])
: proof[proofPos++];
hashes[i] = _hashPair(a, b);
}
if (totalHashes > 0) {
unchecked {
return hashes[totalHashes - 1];
}
} else if (leavesLen > 0) {
return leaves[0];
} else {
return proof[0];
}
}
function _hashPair(bytes32 a, bytes32 b) private pure returns (bytes32) {
return a < b ? _efficientHash(a, b) : _efficientHash(b, a);
}
function _efficientHash(bytes32 a, bytes32 b) private pure returns (bytes32 value) {
/// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
assembly {
mstore(0x00, a)
mstore(0x20, b)
value := keccak256(0x00, 0x40)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.9.0) (utils/cryptography/SignatureChecker.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
import "./ECDSA.sol";
import "../../interfaces/IERC1271.sol";
/**
* @dev Signature verification helper that can be used instead of `ECDSA.recover` to seamlessly support both ECDSA
* signatures from externally owned accounts (EOAs) as well as ERC1271 signatures from smart contract wallets like
* Argent and Gnosis Safe.
*
* _Available since v4.1._
*/
library SignatureChecker {
/**
* @dev Checks if a signature is valid for a given signer and data hash. If the signer is a smart contract, the
* signature is validated against that smart contract using ERC1271, otherwise it's validated using `ECDSA.recover`.
*
* NOTE: Unlike ECDSA signatures, contract signatures are revocable, and the outcome of this function can thus
* change through time. It could return true at block N and false at block N+1 (or the opposite).
*/
function isValidSignatureNow(address signer, bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature) internal view returns (bool) {
(address recovered, ECDSA.RecoverError error) = ECDSA.tryRecover(hash, signature);
return
(error == ECDSA.RecoverError.NoError && recovered == signer) ||
isValidERC1271SignatureNow(signer, hash, signature);
}
/**
* @dev Checks if a signature is valid for a given signer and data hash. The signature is validated
* against the signer smart contract using ERC1271.
*
* NOTE: Unlike ECDSA signatures, contract signatures are revocable, and the outcome of this function can thus
* change through time. It could return true at block N and false at block N+1 (or the opposite).
*/
function isValidERC1271SignatureNow(
address signer,
bytes32 hash,
bytes memory signature
) internal view returns (bool) {
(bool success, bytes memory result) = signer.staticcall(
abi.encodeWithSelector(IERC1271.isValidSignature.selector, hash, signature)
);
return (success &&
result.length >= 32 &&
abi.decode(result, (bytes32)) == bytes32(IERC1271.isValidSignature.selector));
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// OpenZeppelin Contracts (last updated v4.8.0) (utils/cryptography/draft-EIP712.sol)
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
// EIP-712 is Final as of 2022-08-11. This file is deprecated.
import "./EIP712.sol";